Abstract-This paper investigates the optimal regulation problem with the steady-state constraints under distributed decision makings, where each agent is allowed to determine its own optimal set-point according to an individual profit. On the other hand, the utility, which corresponds to an individual public commission, tries to realize a socially optimal solution that fulfills steady-state constraints. In order to align the individual decision making of each agent with the socially optimal solution, the utility is allowed to provide additional price, which corresponds to tax or subsidy for the agent. This paper proposes a real-time pricing strategy of the utility. The proposed pricing strategy is heuristic, but we show that the resulting closed-loop system is stable, if the step size parameter in the real-time pricing strategy is sufficiently small, and realizes tracking to the socially optimal solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Control design problems usually consider regulation and tracking of system states with respect to known set-points or trajectories. Optimal set-points or trajectories are typically given or determined a priori by solving an appropriate optimization problem. The optimization problem may incorporate economical efficiency, e.g. current fuel prices, security limits of the plant and operating constraints, e.g. power balance constraints of electricity supply/demand network, associated with a steady-state operation of the system. The control system may be required to follow a time-varying demand, and the optimization problem should be solved again to reflect new demand condition and update optimal set-points or trajectories in real-time.
If one considers a large scale control system, electrical power supply/demand network for example, an appropriate optimization problem to determine optimal operating conditions becomes large, and solving the problem will be a non-immediate task, especially in real-time. In addition, the components of the entire large scale control system may be distributed, e.g., distributed generators and consumers over the power supply/demand network, and each generator/consumer has own individual economical profit and want to determine its optimal operating condition according to the optimization of individual profit. A centralized optimization to determine the operating conditions is not realistic.
This paper investigates the optimal regulation problem with steady-state constraints under distributed decision makings, where each agent, a component of the entire large scale control system, is allowed to determine its own economically efficient optimal set-point according to its individual profit. On the other hand, the utility, which corresponds to an individual public commission, tries to realize a socially optimal solution that fulfills steady-state constraints. The problem considered in this paper is motivated by price based approaches in power balancing [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , and in order to align the individual decision making of each agent with the socially optimal solution, the utility is allowed to provide additional price, which corresponds to tax to the agent or subsidy from the community, and each agent will participate to the community through optimization of the individual profit with the additional price.
The problem of selecting an economically efficient operating condition has been considered in [9] , [10] and references therein, where the problem is investigated in non-distributed fashion in contrast to the approaches in this paper. A dynamic controller based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions has been proposed in [9] , and a solution that uses penalty and barrier function to deal with constraints has been considered in [10] . The dynamic KKT controller has also been applied to the DC power flow control problem [11] in [5] , where it has also been shown that the dynamics KKT controller can be implemented in a distributed fashion to the DC power flow control problem.
The problem investigated in this paper, optimal regulation problem with steady-state constraints under distributed decision makings, considers selections of economically efficient operating condition by multiple agents. We propose a realtime pricing strategy of the utility, which tries to align the distributed decision making of each agent with the socially optimal solution. The resulting entire closed-loop system eventually realizes tracking to the socially optimal solution, where no-one needs to solve a large scale optimization problem to determine the operating conditions nor to consider iterative computations to decide the price. The proposed realtime pricing strategy is heuristic. It combines the gradient method for maximization problem and the dynamics of the multiple agents. But we show that the closed-loop system is stable at least locally, if the step size parameter in the proposed real-time pricing strategy is sufficiently small. This structural condition of stability may be preferred, since the large scale control system involves a huge number of agents, and checking a stability condition numerically may become difficult. Due to space limitation, all proofs of the technical results can be found in Appendix and [12] .
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section describes the optimal regulation problem with steady-state constraints under distributed decision makings. We list some standing assumptions which will be instrumental in the remaining of this paper.
A. Dynamics of each Agent
We consider a group of n agents, G i , i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent G i has a group of other agents, who are called as the neighbors of G i , and we denote by N i ⊂ N the set of indices of the neighbors of G i . The agent G i has interactions between its neighbors and is represented by equation of the formẋ
where x i ∈ X i ⊂ R ni denotes the state, r i ∈ R mi denotes the reference input, z i ∈ R mi denotes the output to be tracked to r i , w i ∈ W i ⊂ R mwi denotes an exogenous input and
represents interactions between the agents, where we set x i ∈ X i = j∈Ni X i and consider
We suppose that each function in (1) is differentiable as is required. Assumption 1: Let w i ∈ W i be given. For each r i , i ∈ N , there exists unique
for all i ∈ N , and this equilibrium point of (1) is stable at least locally. We suppose that (1) represents a closed-loop system that equipped with a plant to be controlled and local controllers. Assumption 1 requires that this closed-loop system has already been designed as it is locally stable and realizes error free steady state tracking, lim t→∞ z i (t) = r i , for each given
B. Distributed Determinations of Optimal Set-point
For each agent G i , selecting an economically efficient setpoint r i is important. We suppose that each agent G i is allowed to select its own set-point r i . We set an optimization problem for each G i , i ∈ N and suppose that the economically optimal set-point is given as its optimal solution.
where, for each given w i ∈ W i , J i (w i ; ·) : R mi → R is strictly convex and differentiable, and h ij (w i ; ·) : R mi → R is convex and differentiable. We denote by r i , i ∈ N the optimal solution to (3).
An individual public commission, called utility in the remaining of this paper, also tries to incorporate economic efficiency of the agents, but its most important priority is on fulfillment operating constraints at steady-state such as
i∈N W i . Therefore, the utility tries to determine a socially optimal solution as the optimal solution to the following problem.
∈ N and w : W → R define equality constraints that the utility want to satisfy. We denote by r * i , i ∈ N the optimal solution to (4). Assumption 2: For each w ∈ W , the matrix L(w) has full column rank, i.e., rankL(w) = for each w ∈ W .
Assumption 2 means that the representation of the equality constraints in (4c) includes no redundant constraint.
Assumption 3: For each given w ∈ W , constraints in (4b) and (4c) satisfy Slater's constraint qualification condition.
Slater's constraint qualification condition implies that strong duality holds for the problem (4) [13] .
Assumption 4: For each given w ∈ W , there exists an optimal solution to (4).
Due to strict convexity of each J i , the optimal solution to (4) is unique for each w ∈ W , if it exists.
Each agent G i is allowed to determine its own optimal set-point through the optimization of (3). However, it is hard to expect the alignment of r i with r * i . In order to align the individual decision making of each agent G i according to (3) with the socially optimal solution to (4), we suppose that the utility is allowed to provide an additional price p i ∈ R mi , i ∈ N , or, in other word, tax to the agent or subsidy from the community. Therefore, each agent G i participate to the community through the optimization of the following problem.
For each given p i , we denote by r i (p i ) the optimal solution to (5).
Under the above formulations, we consider the feedback interactions between the agents G i , i ∈ N and the utility. The utility utilizes the output data z i (t) from each agent G i and tries to determine and provide the price p i (t) in real-time. The agent G i determines its own input r i (t) as the solution to (5) in real-time according to the provided price p i (t). The optimal regulation problem with steady-state constraints under distributed decision making which will be considered in this paper now can be stated as follows (see also the following Fig. 1 ): design a real-time pricing strategy of the utility that determines p i (t) by utilizing output data z i (t) of (1), and eventually realizes r i (p i (t)) → r * i for all i ∈ N .
III. PRICING STRATEGY
This section investigates steady-state optimality only, and we provide a pricing strategy of the utility that aligns the distributed decision making r i of the agent with the socially optimal solution r * i . Real-time pricing strategy incorporating dynamics (1) of the agents will be considered in the next section.
We start with the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of (4).
From Assumption 3, the strong duality holds to (4). Thus, the optimal solution to (4) can also be determined as the variables that satisfy the conditions in (6).
The following Lemma 1 states that, at least in steadystate, the utility can choose the optimal price p * i that realizes r i (p * i ) = r * i for all i ∈ N . Lemma 1: Let w ∈ W be given and denote the optimal solution to (4) or, equivalently, variables that satisfy the KKT conditions in (6) as r * i , µ * ij , i ∈ N , j ∈ T i and λ * . We have r i (p * i ) = r * i , if the utility provides the price, p i , according to the pricing strategy
IV. GRADIENT BASED REAL-TIME PRICING STRATEGY
In the previous Section III, Lemma 1 shows that the utility can choose the optimal price p * i that aligns the distributed decision making r i of each agent with the socially optimal solution r * i at least in steady-state. The utility need to solve the optimization problem (4) or the KKT conditions in (6) to determine p * i . However, theses problems become very large, since there may exist a huge number of agents. Thus, it may be difficult to solve (4) or (6) and provide its solution p * i in real-time. This section proposes a real-time pricing strategy of the utility which utilizes output data z i (t) from the agents. The proposed strategy is heuristic, which combines the gradient method for maximization problem and the dynamics of agents. The stability of the resulting closedloop system is unclear and it will be investigated in the next Section V.
A. Real-time Pricing Strategy
We start with the dual problem of (4) max λ min r hij (wi;ri)≤0 i∈N j∈Ti i∈N
If we consider only the optimality in steady-state, as similar to the case of Lemma 1, r i will be determined as r i by each agent G i . By substituting this, we have
We apply the gradient method to this maximization problem, then we have
We replace r by its corresponding output z(t) and have a heuristic real-time pricing strategy of the utility aṡ Fig. 1 shows a schematic block diagram of the proposed closed-loop system that equipped with a gradient based pricing strategy (7) and distributed optimization (5) of each agent G i , where we note that, in the proposed closed-loop system, no-one need to solve a large scale optimization problem nor consider iterative calculations to determine the price. In addition, to determine the price, the utility need not know any specific characteristics, like functions f i or J i for example, of the agent G i . We investigate stability of the proposed closed-loop system in Fig. 1 in the following Section V, and we will see that it is actually stable. Thus, the pricing strategy (7) can align distributed decision making of each agent with the socially optimal solution at least locally.
B. Numerical Example
This section considers a numerical example, and we will show how the proposed real-time pricing strategy works. We consider the following coupled dynamics of the two agentṡ
where we set x
. We also set each parameter as ω 11 = 10, ω 12 = 14, ω 21 = 16, ω 22 = 20, ζ 11 = 0.9, ζ 12 = 0.85, ζ 21 = 0.8, ζ 22 = 0.7, k 1 = 10 and k 2 = 20.
For each G i , i = 1 and 2, we define the optimization problem in (3) as
where following simulation example, we use = 1 and consider an exogenous input w as w(t) = 16 → 36 → 52 → 65. Fig. 2 shows resulting time responses of the closedloop system in Fig. 1 . Fig. 2(a) shows the reference input r i , generated as a solution to (5) by each agent G i , as well as, the corresponding output z i , which should track to r i . Fig. 2(b) shows the resulting time responses of price p i = L i (w)λ, determined by the gradient based pricing strategy (7). Fig. 2(c) shows the resulting time response of L(w)z(t) + w (w), and it can be seen that the equality constraint (4c) is fulfilled in steady-state corresponding to each w ∈ W . Figs. 2(d) and 2(e) show that the resulting time response of h i (w i ; z i ) (not h i (w i ; r i )) in the optimization problems (5), and h i (w i ; z i ) > 0 indicates a violation of the inequality constraint, but it will be eventually fulfilled in each steady-state. Figs 2(f) and 2(g) provide another look of time responses in Fig. 2(a) , and each * indicates optimal solution to (4) corresponding to each w ∈ W . It can be confirmed that the proposed pricing strategy leads the steady-state response of each agent to the socially optimal operating condition.
V. STABILITY ANALYSIS
This section investigates stability of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 . The pricing strategy (7) heuristically combines the gradient method for the maximization problem to determine λ and dynamics (1) of each agent G i , and the stability of the resulting closed-loop system in Fig. 1 is not clear.
The closed-loop system in Fig. 1 includes the optimization problem (5) , and stability analysis does not seem to be straightforward. We first, in order to capture the local behavior around the equilibrium point, replace each optimization problem by its gradient in Section V-A. We need to investigate uniqueness of the equilibrium point of this local dynamics and which is considered in Section V-B. Section V-C considers local stability analysis of the closed-loop system, and especially, we show that the resulting closed-loop system in Fig. 1 is stable at least locally for sufficiently small > 0. This structural condition for stability is preferred, since we may have a huge number of agents and a numerical analysis for a large scale system becomes difficult.
We start this section with the following preliminary result. Definition 1: Let w ∈ W be given. A pair (x, λ) and r is said to be an equilibrium point of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 corresponding to w 
T . The following two statements look almost immediate consequences from Assumptions 1 and 4, but it is important in stability analysis.
Lemma 2: For each given w ∈ W , the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 has an equilibrium point (x, λ) and r.
One can confirm that the equilibrium point and the socially optimal solution to (4) is actually identical for each given w ∈ W .
Lemma 3: Let w ∈ W be given and a pair (x, λ) and r be an equilibrium point of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 corresponding to w. The equilibrium point (x, λ) and r is unique.
A. Local Behavior of Distributed Decision Makings
The closed-loop system in Fig. 1 includes the optimization problem (5) , and the stability analysis does not seem to be straightforward and global stability analysis may not be easy. This subsection investigates the local dynamics of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 around the equilibrium point corresponding to a given w ∈ W . We capture the (5) (e) a time history of h 2 (w 2 ; z 1 ) (not h 2 (w 2 ; r 1 )) that indicates inequality constraints for the agent G 2 . mapping from the price, p i , to the reference input, r i , and investigate the gradient of this mapping. Let w ∈ W be given and denote by r * i , µ * ij , i ∈ N , j ∈ T i and λ * the corresponding optimal solution to (4) or, equivalently, the variables which satisfy the KKT conditions in (6). We set p * i = L T i (w)λ * , i ∈ N and consider the optimal solution r i (p * i ) to (5). We define
contains all index j ∈ T i such that the inequality constraint in (5b) becomes active with the optimal solution r i (p * ). Therefore, we have the optimality conditions as follows
We now consider the following assumption.
are possibly sufficiently small, the assumption considers the case such that the constraint h ij that is active with p * i still remains active with p * + δp i . Under Assumption 5, we have the conditions in (8), which are identically held for all p i ∈ {p * i } + U pi , thus we consider the derivative of (8)
By calculating derivatives of each component in the above equation, we obtain
We set
and, by multiplying the matrix (∂r/∂p) T from the right to (9a), we have that
From the necessary condition for the optimally, we have
i > 0, and this concludes that
where δr i denotes the small deviation from r * i = r (p * i ) due to the small deviation δp i from p * i .
We now investigate numerical procedures to determine the gradient
∂h i2
where |I i (p * i )| denotes the number of elements in the set I i (p * i ). We also set variables to be determined as
From (9), for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m i , we have the following
Thus, the gradient
/∂p i ) ≥ 0 can be numerically determined for each i ∈ N . The gradient E i represents the local behavior around the equilibrium point and, eventually, it depends on a given w i ∈ W i . We denote as E i (w i ) in the remaining of the paper.
B. Uniqueness of the Equilibrium Point
Let w ∈ W be given and a pair (x, λ) and r be an equilibrium point of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 corresponding to w. As we have seen in Lemma 3, the equilibrium point is unique with the closed-loop dynamics in Fig. 1 , and it is also an equilibrium point of the closed-loop dynamics with the gradient derived in Section V-A. However its uniqueness is not straightforward. We start with the following definition.
Definition 2: Let w ∈ W be give and a pair (x, λ) and r be an equilibrium point of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 corresponding to w. The pair (x, λ) and r is said to be an isolated equilibrium point in local behavior, if
are held for all i ∈ N only for δλ = 0. Let the pair (x, λ) and r be an isolated equilibrium point in local behavior for a given w ∈ W , δλ = 0 implies that δx = 0 and δr = 0. Therefore, if one considers local dynamics around (x, λ) and r, (δx, δλ) = (0, 0) and δr = 0 is an unique equilibrium point of the local dynamics.
Lemma 4: Let w ∈ W be give and a pair (x, λ) and r be an equilibrium point corresponding to w. The following two statements are equivalent:
1) The pair (x, λ) and r is an isolated equilibrium point in local behavior. 2) The matrix L(w)E(w)L T (w) ∈ R × is non-singular, where E(w) = block diag(E 1 (w 1 ), . . . , E n (w n )).
Since each matrix
E i (w i ) is only positive semi-definite, E i (w i ) ≥ 0, there is a possibility that L(w)E(w)L T (w) becomes singular.
C. Local Stability of the Closed-loop System
This subsection presents two results for local stability of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 . Both results are stated under the condition in the item 2) of Lemma 4.
Let w ∈ W be given and a pair (x, λ) and r be an equilibrium point of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 corresponding to w ∈ W . We consider the linearization of each agent dynamics (1) as
where
, and δx i , δx i , δz i and δr i , i ∈ N represent small deviation from the equilibrium point, respectively.
By appropriately aligning the matrices in (12), we set the matrices A(w), B(w) and C(w) which represent the entire linearized dynamics in (12) for all i ∈ N . Together with δλ(t) = Lδz(t), δp(t) = L T δλ(t) and δr = −Eδp, the linearized dynamics of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 is given by
where δx = [δx
T and δλ denotes small deviation from λ. We immediately have the following local stability result.
Theorem 1: Let w ∈ W be given and a pair (x, λ) and r be an equilibrium point of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 corresponding to w. Suppose that the matrix L(w)E(w)L T (w) is non-singular. The pair (x, λ) and r is a stable equilibrium point of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 at least locally, if the linear system in (13) is stable.
Theorem 1 states general local stability conditions. However, we may consider a large network of the agents, where there are huge number of agents, and checking the stability of a large size matrix in (13) may become difficult. A structural stability condition such as the closed-loop system is locally stable for small > 0 may be preferred. The following Theorem 2 states that the closed-loop system is actually stable for small > 0.
Theorem 2: Let w ∈ W be given and a pair (x, λ) and r be an equilibrium point of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 corresponding to w. Suppose that the matrix L(w)E(w)L T (w) is non-singular. The pair (x, λ) and r is a stable equilibrium point of the closed-loop system in Fig. 1 at least locally, if > 0 in (7) is sufficiently small.
The structural stability condition in Theorem 2 is preferred, since the network may contains huge number of agents and a numerical approach for stability analysis becomes difficult. In a large network, communication delays could arise another issue, and an effect of time-delays due to communication networks in the proposed real-time pricing strategy is studied in [14] . On the other hand, if one considers a small network, like a network so-called microgrid, a numerical computation for stability analysis may be acceptable. In this case, a stability condition in LMIs can be obtained without introducing the gradient of the optimization problem in Section V-A [15] .
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by the control problems of distributed systems, this paper investigates the optimal regulation problem with the steady-state constraints under distributed decision makings, where each agent is allowed to determine its own optimal set-point according to an individual profit. On the other hand, the utility, which corresponds to an individual public commission, tries to realize a socially optimal solution that fulfills operating constraints. In order to align the individual decision making of each agent with the socially optimal solution, the utility provides additional price, which corresponds to tax or subsidy for the agent. This paper proposed the real-time pricing strategy of the utility. The proposed pricing strategy is heuristic, but we showed that the resulting closed-loop system is stable at least locally, if the step size parameter of the gradient method is sufficiently small.
remaining of this proof, we will see that each graph of 1 + (1/s)λ i (s), as s goes once around the ω -modified Dcontour, encircles the origin, and this will conclude that the characteristic loci of I + (1/s)LM (s)EL T , taken together, encircle the origin -times. 
From (16) and (17), for any possibly small a > 0, and any possibly large R > 1, we can find ω 2 > ω 1 such that |∠h i (jω) − −π 2 | < a and |h i (jω)| > R for all ω ∈ (0, ω 2 ), and all i = 1, 2, . . . , .
2) Medium to High frequency portion: We will see that we can pick > 0, possibly small, such that Re[h i (jω)] > 0 holds for all ω ∈ [ ω 2 , ∞) and all i = 1, 2, . . . , . We set where g m ≤ 0, because of (15) .
We note that, since ω > 0, Re[h i (jω)] > 0 is equivalent to Re[ωh i (jω)] > 0. For each ω ∈ [ω 2 , ∞), from the definition of g m , we have
